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Over the last couple of decades, most neuroscientific research on social cognition has
been dominated by a third-person paradigm in which participating subjects are not actively
engaging with other agents but merely observe them. Recently this paradigm has been
challenged by researchers who promote a second-person approach to social cognition,
and emphasize the importance of dynamic, real-time interactions with others. The present
article’s contribution to this debate is twofold. First, we critically analyze the second-person
challenge to social neuroscience, and assess the various ways in which the distinction
between second- versus third-person modes of social cognition has been articulated.
Second, we put forward an alternative conceptualization of this distinction—one that gives
pride of place to the notion of reciprocity. We discuss the implications of our proposal for
neuroscientific studies on social cognition.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the main challenges for contemporary neuroscience has
been to uncover the neural correlates of social cognition. Research
in this area has been dominated by two main theories: the Theory
Theory and the Simulation Theory. According to the Theory
Theory, social cognition depends on a “Theory of Mind”—a
psychological theory about how beliefs, desires, and intentions
are interrelated and inform actions (Fodor, 1992; Gopnik and
Meltzoff, 1997; Carruthers, 2009). Simulation Theory claims that
social cognition involves “putting ourselves in the shoes of others”
by simulating the mental states we would have in their situation
(Goldman, 2006; Hurley, 2008; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011).
Despite the fact that they are often portrayed as rivals, most
versions of the Theory Theory and the Simulation Theory share
an important assumption. They take it for granted that social
understanding (usually) involves “mindreading,” i.e., the capacity
to attribute mental states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions
to others in order to predict or explain their behavior (Nichols
and Stich, 2003; Apperly, 2011). Mindreading does not require
us to interact with other people: we may simply speculate about
their mental states while standing at the margins of the situation.
As a result, proponents of the Theory Theory and the Simulation
Theory have primarily investigated the neural correlates of social
cognition by means of a “third-person” (3P) approach in which
participating subjects are not actively engaging with other agents
but merely observe them. Most studies on the neural correlates of
Theory of Mind, for example, require subjects to make inferences
about how the protagonist of a story would behave or feel (for
review, see: Mar, 2011). These experiments are usually devoid of
any interaction between the subjects and the protagonist whose
mental states they are supposed to read. This lack of interaction
is also characteristic of neuroimaging research conducted in the
Simulation Theory framework. Studies of the mirror neuron sys-
tem (MNS), for instance, typically involve a condition in which
subjects observe another agent who performs an action, and a
condition in which they perform the same action themselves.
However, there is no interaction between the subjects and the
agent in either condition.
Recently this 3P paradigm has been challenged by researchers
who call for a “second-person” (2P) approach to social cogni-
tion. These “interaction theorists,” as we will label them, argue
that the Theory Theory and the Simulation Theory are funda-
mentally flawed because they fail to recognize the importance of
our dynamic interactions with others1. What is needed, accord-
ing to them, is an “interactive turn” in social cognition research
(de Jaegher et al., 2010). Some interaction theorists suggest that a
2P approach will shed new light on the neural mechanisms that
underlie social cognition (Schilbach et al., forthcoming). Others
claim that a 2P approach does justice to the phenomenology of
our everyday encounters with others (Ratcliffe, 2007; Gallagher
and Zahavi, 2008). Then there are those who think that a 2P
approach to social cognition will allow us to solve the problem
of other minds, i.e., the problem of how we can access the mind
of others (Gallagher, 2004; Reddy, 2008). Besides these differ-
ent motivations for advocating a 2P approach to social cognition,
interaction theorists also have different conceptions of what such
an approach precisely entails, and how it should be spelled out in
contrast to the 3P approach endorsed by the Theory Theory and
the Simulation Theory.
The first aim of the present article is to critically analyze
the 2P challenge to social neuroscience, and assess the various
ways in which interaction theorists have articulated the distinc-
tion between 2P versus 3P modes of social cognition. In Section
1This narrow approach to social cognition is probably partly the result of cer-
tain methodological problems that enter the picture when one tries to investi-
gate dynamic second-person interactions (see Schilbach et al., forthcoming).
We thank one of the reviewers for bringing this to our attention.
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“Against the Idea of an ‘Observational Stance’”, we argue that
interaction theorists are right to oppose the idea of an “obser-
vational stance.” Drawing a parallel with recent criticism on the
two-systems model of visual perception, we will show that there
actually is no such thing as passive observation—every perceiver,
nomatter how detached, is actively involved in what she perceives.
Although we take this to be a strong argument for interaction the-
ory, it also shows that we cannot use the difference between active
engagement and passive observation to ground a strong distinc-
tion between 2P and 3P modes of social cognition. In Section
“Social Interaction Versus Social Cognition,” we discuss another
way of explicating this distinction. Some interaction theorists not
onlymake a case for the intertwinement of perception and action,
but also claim that this may be constitutive of social cognition.
According to them, there are situations in which social cogni-
tion is nothing over and above social interaction. However, we
argue not only that social cognition often does entail more than
social interaction, but also that the proposed contrast between
social interaction and social cognition does not provide a good
basis for the distinction between 2P versus 3P modes of social
cognition.
The second aim of the article is to put forward an alternative
conceptualization of the distinction between 2P versus 3P modes
of social cognition—one that gives pride of place to the notion
of reciprocity. In Section “Reconceptualizing 2P Interaction,” we
argue that what distinguishes 2P from 3P modes of social cogni-
tion is not their interactive or non-cognitive nature, but rather
the fact that they involve reciprocal interaction. On our view, 2P
modes of social cognition may and often do recruit capacities
that interaction theorists take to be characteristic of 3P modes of
social cognition—as long as the demand for reciprocity is met.
Finally, in Section “The Real Challenge to Social Neuroscience,”
we briefly compare our proposal to Frith and Frith’s (2011) “sig-
naling model” of social cognition, and discuss its implications for
neuroscientific experiments on social cognition.
AGAINST THE IDEA OF AN “OBSERVATIONAL STANCE”
Interaction theorists often criticize the 3P stance toward others
that is presupposed by the Theory Theory and the Simulation
Theory for being a specialized and relatively rare mode of social
cognition—one that is characterized by a lack of actual interac-
tion and a reliance on passive observation. They argue that, in
everyday life, we find ourselves constantly engaged in dynamic
interactions with others: we buy a ticket at the counter of the
station, travel by train with our fellow passengers, have a coffee
with our colleagues and discuss new plans in a meeting. These 2P
modes of social cognition do not require us to adopt an observa-
tional stance. In what follows, we will provide a further argument
against the idea of a “pure” observational stance by drawing a
parallel with recent criticism on the two-systems model of visual
perception.
According to the two-systems model, visual perception
depends on two different streams that are both functionally and
neurally segregated. Dating back to the early work of Leslie
Ungerleider and popularized by Milner and Goodale, this influ-
ential model distinguishes a ventral processing stream dedicated
to “vision-for-perception” from a dorsal stream that is involved
in “vision-for-action” (Milner and Goodale, 2008). The ventral
processing pathway projects from early visual areas to the inferior
temporal lobe, while the dorsal processing pathway projects to the
parietal lobe. Neuropsychological support for this distinction is
provided by patients with visual form agnosia, such as patient DF,
who was unable to report the orientation of a bar that he was
able to grasp in a correct way (Goodale et al., 1991). By contrast,
patients with optic ataxia show preserved object recognition abil-
ities, while having difficulties with directing actions toward these
same objects. Other evidence for a dissociation between the dor-
sal and ventral visual stream has been obtained by studies on
visual illusions, showing for instance that grasping kinematics
in the Ebbinghaus illusion are insensitive to the illusory percept
accompanying the mere perception of the stimulus (Smeets and
Brenner, 2006). The two-systems model has been further corrob-
orated by neuroimaging studies showing that visual information
is processed differently depending on whether the information
is used for subsequent action or perception (e.g., Valyear et al.,
2006).
However, the two-systems model has not gone unchallenged.
First, within the neuroscience community an ongoing debate con-
cerns the interpretation of the evidence in favor of the two streams
hypothesis (for recent discussion, see: Schenk and McIntosh,
2010). For instance, several studies have shown that grasping and
pointing movements are affected by visual illusions as well (see
for instance: Skewes et al., 2011). In addition, in a recent paper
it has been shown that patient DF’s differential performance on
the action and perception task can largely be accounted for by
the effects of haptic feedback (i.e., only after grasping she gets
feedback about the correctness of the movement; Schenk, 2012).
At a neural level there is strong evidence for reciprocal interac-
tions between dorsal and ventral stream areas at several levels in
the processing hierarchy (Himmelbach and Karnath, 2005; Pisella
et al., 2006). For example, it has been shown that the ability to
consciously see an object and identify its “Gestalt” depends on
both ventral and dorsal processing streams (Huberle and Karnath,
2011). Finally, the errors displayed by patients with optic ataxia
or visual form agnosia cannot always easily be interpreted as
evidence in favor of damage to one specific visual stream. For
instance, patient DF, with supposed damage to ventral stream
areas showed action planning deficits as well, such as a failure
to anticipate the fingertip forces required for object grasping or
displaying action semantic errors such as grasping objects in a
functionally incorrect way (Carey et al., 1996). These consider-
ations have led to a revision of the original two-systems model,
such that the distinction between dorsal and ventral processing
streams should be considered as reflecting a relative rather than an
absolute functional specialization (Schenk and McIntosh, 2010).
In recent philosophical debates, the basic assumptions
underlying the two-systems model have also been contested.
Proponents of the sensorimotor approach to visual cognition, for
example, have argued that the strict distinction between “vision-
for-perception” and “vision-for-action” is misguided, because
there is no such thing as pure “vision-for-perception” (O’Regan
and Noe, 2001; Noë, 2004). They argue that the problems with the
two-systems model described above testify to the fact that percep-
tion involves the employment of sensorimotor skills, and cannot
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be fully separated from action2. Whenever we see a tomato, for
example, our eyes only take into the fovea the plane orthogo-
nal to the vector of the eyes’ focus. However, our sensorimotor
capacities let us perceive the tomato as a three-dimensional solid
object—one that can be grasped, and which appearance changes
as we move around it. On the view advocated by the sensorimo-
tor approach, the visual system has evolved in order to enable
us to act in the surrounding world (Wheeler, 2006). As a result,
the way in which we perceive the world depends on our bodily
capabilities.
The idea that perception and action are intimately linked is
not new and dates back to the ideomotor principle put for-
ward by William James, who noted that “every representation
of a movement awakens in some degree the actual movement
which is its object” (James, 1890/1981). More recently this prin-
ciple has seen renewed interest in the so-called “theory of event
coding,” according to which perception and action share a com-
mon representational format (Hommel et al., 2001). Support
for this idea is found in behavioral experiments for instance, in
which it is shown that the presentation of an action effect (e.g.,
a sound) results in the reactivation of the motor program associ-
ated with achieving the action effect (e.g., making a button press;
e.g., Hommel, 1996). These findings reflect that based on train-
ing we have acquired strong associations between specific actions
and their resultant effects. The ideomotor principle accounts for
a wide range of behaviors in which perception and action are
tightly linked, such as imitation, observational learning and joint
action. In the case of imitation, for instance, observing a specific
movement, such as lifting a finger, activates in the observer the
corresponding motor program required for achieving the effect
and thereby facilitates imitative behavior (e.g., Brass et al., 2000).
At a neural level, this perception-action coupling is likely medi-
ated by visuomotor neurons in premotor and parietal areas (Koski
et al., 2002; Kilner et al., 2004; Newman-Norlund et al., 2007).
A complementary line of evidence for the idea that perception
is directly coupled to action can be found in the “selection-for-
action” principle, according to which the sole purpose of the
perceptual system is to gather information for interaction with
the environment (Allport, 1987). It has been found for instance,
that one’s action intention determines the way in which sensory
information is processed already at an early stage in the visual sys-
tem, as reflected in a modulation of early visual evoked potentials
when one intends to grasp compared to point toward a target (van
Elk et al., 2010). Together these studies highlight the close link of
perception and action, and suggest that any attempt to demarcate
perception- from action-related processes in a principled way is
arbitrary.
The criticism of the two-systems model of visual perception
can be extended to the debate on social cognition to illustrate that
there is no such thing as a pure observational stance toward oth-
ers. For example, Schilbach et al. (2008) have shown that when we
see a smiling face we automatically tend to mimic this smile, at
least in terms of specific muscle activation. Therefore, the authors
2We believe this claim is sound, even though we acknowledge that there are
serious problems with Noë’s theory of object perception (Schlicht and Pompe,
2007).
conclude that “the process of perceiving faces always includes an
‘enactive’ element through which we engage with and respond to
stimuli instead of a mere ‘passive’ perception of face-based cues.”
Another illustration is provided by theMNS studies: if one takes a
closer look at the neural processes involved in cases where subjects
“passively” observe another agent’s action from a 3P point of view,
one notices that there is only a short amount of time (30–100ms)
between the activation of the visual cortex and the activation of
the pre-motor cortex (Gallagher, 2007).
Although this casts doubt on the possibility to draw a strict
demarcation line between action and perception, it does not
imply that we cannot differentiate between observation and
action conditions. The MNS studies, for example, show that dur-
ing the observation of another agent’s action, our motor system
becomes active “as if” we were executing the action ourselves
(Gallese, 2001). Some argue that in the case of action observation
the actual execution of the action is inhibited (Schutz-Bosbach
et al., 2009). Others claim that the absence of an efference copy of
the motor command signals that the event is externally generated
(Wolpert et al., 1995). However, what is agreed upon is that we can
sensibly distinguish between observation and action conditions.
SOCIAL INTERACTION VERSUS SOCIAL COGNITION
Interactivists often claim that 2P interactions rather than 3P
observations are the backbone of social cognition. More in par-
ticular, they argue that 2P modes of social cognition are primary
to 3P modes of social cognition, not only in the sense that (1)
they involve capabilities that come earlier in development and are
likely to be partially innate, but also in the sense that (2) they
remain the default way how we understand others (Gallagher,
2001, 2011).
The first claim about the developmental primacy of 2P modes
of social cognition might look problematic in the light of recent
studies on “implicit” false belief understanding in early infancy.
Several “spontaneous-response” false belief tests, in which infants’
understanding of false belief is inferred from the behavior they
spontaneously produce (e.g., anticipatory looking, longer look-
ing times), seem to indicate that infants at a very young age
are already able to adopt a 3P observational stance toward other
agents in order to anticipate their behavior (see Baillargeon et al.,
2010 for an overview).
However, even without taking into account these findings, pro-
ponents of the Theory Theory and the Simulation Theory could
maintain that the claim about developmental primacy is compati-
ble with the idea that social development basically comes down to
a transition from 2P to 3P modes of social cognition. As Currie
(2008, p. 212) sees it, for instance, the abilities for 2P modes
of social cognition “underpin early intersubjective understand-
ing, and make way for the development of later theorizing or
simulation [i.e., 3P modes of social cognition]” (see Spaulding,
2010 for a discussion). However, this is certainly not what most
interaction theorists have in mind. They argue that 2P interac-
tion does not “make way” for purportedly more sophisticated
mindreading processes, but instead continues to characterize our
everyday encounters even as adults. This is where the second
claim about the dominance of 2P interaction comes in. If we
look at the “phenomenological evidence” and pay attention to
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our “everyday experience,” so the argument goes, we will find
that 2P interactions rather than 3P observations are pervasive
in our social life (see, e.g., Ratcliffe, 2007; Gallagher and Zahavi,
2008).
As we have argued elsewhere (de Bruin et al., 2011; de Bruin
and Kästner, 2012), the claim that 2P interactions remain the
default way how we understand others is problematic inso-
far it depends on an appeal to phenomenology. The question
which mode of social cognition is characteristic of our every-
day encounters with others is an empirical one, and cannot
be decided on the basis of a “simple phenomenological argu-
ment” (Gallagher, 2004). Overgaard and Michael (under review)
rightly criticize the idea of having a single “everyday stance”
toward other people: in the course of any one day, we not only
interact with others in various ways, but we also, and not infre-
quently, simply observe people. Ultimately, the question about
the dominance of 2P versus 3P modes of social cognition might
simply boil down to a question about the commonality of a
certain type of personality, for instance, extrovert (as in “inter-
acting”) versus introvert (as in “observing”) (McCrae and Costa,
1987).
Claims about the developmental primacy and phenomeno-
logical pervasiveness of 2P versus 3P modes of social cognition
also face a more general worry. If interaction theorists spell
out the difference between 2P and 3P modes of social cogni-
tion in terms of active engagement versus passive observation,
then it becomes unclear how to draw a line between 2P and 3P
modes of social cognition. For, as we have argued in the pre-
vious section, the distinction between active engagement and
passive observation appears to be gradual rather than abso-
lute. And this, in turn, undermines the claims about the devel-
opmental primacy and phenomenological pervasiveness of 2P
interactions.
Some interaction theorists, however, spell out the difference
between 2P and 3P modes of social cognition in a different way.
They claim that 2P modes of social cognition are “direct” in
the sense that they do not require cognitive processes to medi-
ate between our perception of others and our actions toward
them. Gallagher (2008, p. 540), for instance, maintains that
“what we call social cognition is often nothing more than social
interaction. What I perceive in these cases does not constitute
something short of understanding. Rather my understanding
of the other person is constituted within the perception–action
loops that define the various things that I am doing with or in
response to others.” Gallagher proposes a rich notion of enac-
tive perception, which is meant to obviate the kind of cognitive
processes postulated by the Theory Theory and the Simulation
Theory. He argues that “in seeing the actions and expressive
movements of the other person in the context of the surround-
ing world, one already sees their meaning; no inference to a
hidden set of mental states (beliefs, desires, etc.) is necessary”
(ibid., p. 542).
In a recent article, de Jaegher et al. (2010) explain in more
detail how social cognition can be equivalent to social interac-
tion. The authors distinguish between constitutive and enabling
conditions for social cognition. In contrast to an enabling con-
dition, according to which the ability must have been acquired at
some point in development, a constitutive condition requires that
the ability is exercised at the very moment we are trying to make
sense of others. de Jaegher et al. (2010) argue that, in some cases,
2P interactions can be a constitutive and not merely an enabling
condition for social cognition.
It is not our aim here to argue against this modest claim.
Rather, we would like to point out that interaction theorists still
have to account for those cases in which social cognition clearly
is something over and above social interaction. Take interaction
theory’s criticism of the 3P paradigm employed by the Theory
of Mind approach and the Simulation Theory, for example. As
Overgaard and Michael (under review) argue, if interaction theo-
rists agree that this paradigm puts subjects in the role of detached
spectators rather than interacting agents—and their complaint
shows that they do agree with this—then the results of these
experiments clearly show that social cognition is possible with-
out social interaction. Or consider empirical studies of cases in
which social interaction is completely lacking but a capacity for
social cognition remains. Patients suffering from a total “locked-
in-syndrome” (Bauer et al., 1979), for example, are no longer able
to engage in real-time interaction with others, but they are still
able to understand them to some degree (Laureys et al., 2005)3.
We can find similar dissociations between enabling and con-
stitutive conditions in other domains as well. For example, the
development of a body image, i.e., a (cognitive) system of per-
ceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to oneself (Cash and
Brown, 1987; Powers et al., 1987; Gardner and Moncrieff, 1988),
depends on a body schema—a system of sensorimotor capaci-
ties that functions without reflective or perceptual monitoring
in an immediate and close to automatic fashion (Gallagher,
2005). Although a body schema is an enabling condition for
a body image, it is not constitutive condition. Patients with
deafferentation, such as Ian Waterman (Cole, 1995; Gallagher
and Cole, 1995), suffer from certain impairments in their body
schema (loss of tactile and proprioceptive input), but their
body image remains intact and even allows them to compensate
their disabilities to some extent. Another interesting dissociation
between enabling and constitutive conditions has been found
in relation to the use of linguistic concepts. Whereas there is
a clear correlation between action verbs like “kick,” “pick” and
“lick” and pre-motor cortex activation (Pulvermüller and Fadiga,
2010), this is not the case for abstract verbs such as “think”
(Rueschemeyer et al., 2007). In other words, although under-
standing action verbs may be a necessary step for understanding
more abstract psychological verbs, it is certainly not a constitutive
condition.
What these examples show is that it is not hard to come up
with cases in which social cognition is something over and above
social interaction. The question is to what extent interaction the-
orists are able to account for these often more advanced forms
of social cognition. According to de Jaegher and Froese (2009,
p. 439), the biggest challenge for interaction theorists is “to show
how an explanatory framework that accounts for basic biologi-
cal processes [i.e., enactivism] can be systematically extended to
3Total locked-in syndrome is a version of locked-in syndrome where the eyes
are paralyzed as well.
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incorporate the highest reaches of human cognition.” This is what
they call “the cognitive gap”4.
A more important question for our purpose here, however,
is whether the proposed contrast between social interaction and
social cognition provides us with a good basis for the distinc-
tion between 2P versus 3P modes of social cognition. For most
interaction theorists, the main target in the debate on social cog-
nition has been the so-called “sandwich model” of the mind,
which regards “perception as input from the world to the mind,
action as output from the mind to the world, and cognition as
sandwiched in between” (Hurley, 2008, p. 2). According to the
sandwich model, cognition is required in order to “translate”
visual input into motor output, since there is no direct interaction
between perception and action. Because of their commitment
to this model, many proponents of the Theory Theory and the
Simulation Theory have simply assumed that our social engage-
ments require us to engage in a cognitive process of mental state
attribution (by means of either theory or simulation or both).
On the one hand, we agree with interaction theorists that the
sandwich model should not be presupposed as a general model
underlying all forms of social cognition (as mindreaders tend
to do). At the same time, however, from this it does not auto-
matically follow that one has to reject the cognitive capacities
that are thought to be representative of the sandwich model.
Some of these capacities might actually play an important role
in 2P modes of social cognition as well. In the next section, we
will substantiate this idea by proposing an alternative conceptu-
alization of the distinction between 2P and 3P modes of social
cognition.
RECONCEPTUALIZING 2P INTERACTION
We propose that what distinguishes 2P from 3P modes of social
cognition is their reciprocal nature. That is, 2P modes of social
cognition feature agents who coordinate their actions with one
another—what is sometimes called “attunement” (Fuchs and de
Jaegher, 2009; de Jaegher et al., 2010). Importantly, we take the
capacity for reciprocal interaction to be an ontogenetic achieve-
ment and not something that human beings are simply bornwith.
Following Sebanz et al. (2006), we can identify several important
developmental stepping stones.
First of all, reciprocal interaction depends on the ability to
share representations of objects and events with others. Visual
habituation studies indicate that 5-month-old infants already
respond selectively to the goals of another agent rather than
the physical details of their actions (Woodward, 1998, 2005).
However, it is not until 9–12 months of age that they begin
to engage in shared attention, and their interactions with oth-
ers begin to have a reference to the things that surround them
(Hobson, 2002; Tomasello et al., 2005). Shared attention cre-
ates a “perceptual common ground” insofar it requires that the
attending of infant and agent has a common focus. This allows
infants to direct another agent’s attention to outside objects in
which they are interested in themselves. The pointing gesture,
4See de Bruin and de Haan (forthcoming) for a more detailed discussion of
this problem and a thorough evaluation of recent proposals that try to bridge
this cognitive gap.
for example, enables them to declare their interest in specific
objects in their surroundings (Phillips et al., 2002;Woodward and
Guajardo, 2002; Sodian and Thoermer, 2004). More importantly,
however, shared attention also allows infants to coordinate their
actions with those of another agent. Meltzoff (1995) showed that
18-month-olds are capable of completing an unfinished action of
another agent, such as pulling apart miniature dumbbells.
Although shared attention provides interacting agents with a
focal point of interest, it is grounded in a more basic system
for sharing representations: the MNS. The MNS matches action
observation and action production (Rizzolati and Craighero,
2004; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010), and facilitates a “common
coding” of perception and action (see Section “Against the Idea
of an ‘Observational Stance’”)5. MNS activation has been inves-
tigated in early infancy as well (Kanakogi and Itakura, 2010), and
research on infant imitation has been cited as evidence for the fact
that the MNS is an innate mechanism (e.g., Iacoboni et al., 1999;
Decety et al., 2002; Grezes et al., 2003; Iacoboni, 2005; Iacoboni
and Dapretto, 2006)6.
What is important is that the MNS facilitates action antic-
ipation, which is considered a second prerequisite for coordi-
nating one’s actions with those of another agent according to
Sebanz et al. (2006). Knowing what the other will do next is
crucial for coordinating one’s actions with those of another
agent. Falck-Ytter et al. (2006), for example, showed that 12-
month-old infants are capable of anticipating an agent’s action
toward an object (picking up and placing it in a container) by
making eye movements ahead of the moving hand. The experi-
menters argued that these findings provide direct support for the
idea that action anticipation depends on a MNS which is trig-
gered by the infant’s perception of another agent’s goal-directed
behavior. More direct support for the involvement of the MNS
in action prediction was obtained in a study by Meyer et al.
(2011), which showed a stronger anticipatory motor-related brain
response when 3-year old children observed the action of a part-
ner they were actively interacting with compared to the action of
an outsider.
We can elucidate the role of the MNS in action anticipation
by mapping the neural circuit of the MNS onto an inverse-
forward model (Iacoboni, 2003, 2005). The superior temporal
sulcus (STS) is responsible for the visual representation of an
observed action. An inverse model then feeds this visual represen-
tation into the fronto-parietal MNS and converts it into a motor
plan. In a next step, this motor plan is sent back from the fronto-
parietal mirror neuron to the STS and converted into a predicted
visual representation (a sensory outcome of action) by means of a
5Overlapping MNS activation has also been found when subjects listen to
action-related sounds (Aglioti and Pazzaglia, 2010), observe another person
being touched (Keysers et al., 2010) or observe emotional expressions (Wicker
et al., 2003).
6However, we would like to point out that there are still many open questions
about the role of the MNS in infant development (Gerson and Woodward,
2010; Meltzoff, 2006). It is also not clear whether the MNS should indeed
be seen as an inherited adaptation for action understanding (an evolved sys-
tem), or rather as a byproduct of associative learning that is shaped through
interaction with others and which is basically the result of social experience
(Heyes, 2010).
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forward model. This two-step process explains how infants (and
adults, see Flanagan and Johansson, 2003; Ambrosini et al., 2011)
are able to track another agent’s goal-directed behavior toward
objects with predictive eye-movements.
The MNS might also play a role in the initiation and execu-
tion of complementary actions. Newman-Norlund et al. (2007)
found that mirror neuron areas (right inferior frontal gyrus and
bilateral inferior parietal lobes) are more active when observers
are simultaneously preparing a complementary action than when
they are preparing an imitative action. However, as Sebanz et al.
(2006) point out, the ability to prepare complementary actions
cannot be fully explained in terms of shared representations.
Motor resonance might enable action anticipation, but this (1)
crucially depends on action perception and (2) does not explain
how we become capable of choosing an appropriate comple-
mentary action at an appropriate time. In order to address the
first point, Sebanz et al. (2006) appeal to studies on shared task
representations, in which two agents have to covertly represent
each other’s task requirements without observing each other’s
action. For instance, in a study by Ramnani andMiall (2004), par-
ticipants acquired stimulus–response mappings, and were then
presented with stimuli indicating whether they should respond, a
co-actor in another room should respond, or a computer should
respond. Although the other’s actions could not be observed, par-
ticipants anticipated the co-actor’s actions. This was associated
with activity in motor areas, including ventral premotor cor-
tex, as well as areas typically involved in mindreading. According
to Sebanz et al. (2006), these results suggest that the mecha-
nisms underlying mental state attribution might be triggered
by shared task representations (cf. Sebanz and Frith, 2004). In
order to deal with the second point, Sebanz et al. (2006) pos-
tulate a third prerequisite for action coordination: the ability to
integrate the predicted effects of own and others’ actions. They
discuss this ability in relation to a number of studies that show
how individuals incorporate others’ action capabilities into their
own action planning (Richardson et al., 2007), and how tempo-
ral feedback about another agent’s action is used in anticipatory
action control (Knoblich and Jordan, 2003; Jordan and Knoblich,
2004).
Sebanz et al. (2006) pay relatively little attention to what we
take to be another crucial prerequisite for reciprocal interaction:
perspective taking. In order to engage in reciprocal interaction,
agents have to be able to account for differences in perspective.
Elsewhere, we have proposed a developmental model in which
we distinguish three modes of perspective taking (de Bruin and
Newen, 2012):
(a) Motor perspective taking, which allows infants to under-
stand another agent on the basis of her movements (e.g.,
Woodward, 1998, 2003, 2005).
(b) Visual perspective taking, which allows infants to understand
another agent on the basis of what she (visually) perceives
(e.g., Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate et al., 2007).
(c) Cognitive perspective taking, which allows children to under-
stand another agent on the basis of propositional attitudes
such as beliefs and desires (e.g., Wimmer and Perner, 1983;
Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Rakoczy et al., 2007).
The development of perspective taking is important insofar as
reciprocal interaction requires that agents are on “the same level.”
For example, classic versions of the false belief test show that
children under 4 years of age fail to verbally predict the behav-
ior of another agent on the basis of her false belief (cognitive
perspective taking). Of course this does not mean that they are
unable to engage in reciprocal interaction. As Gallagher (2005)
has pointed out, for example, although these children fail to pre-
dict the behavior of the agent they observe, they have no difficulty
understanding the experimenter. But it does show that they are
not yet able to reciprocally interact with other agents in terms of
their (false) beliefs—at least not on a verbal level7. More advanced
modes of perspective taking allow children to engage in more
advanced modes of social interaction.
Importantly, the various capacities described above can be
recruited in 2P as well as 3P modes of social cognition. They are
not to be classified as 2P or 3P because of their interactive or
perceptual nature, or because they do or do not involve cogni-
tive processing. What counts instead is whether they are recruited
for reciprocal (2P) or non-reciprocal (3P) interaction. On our
view, therefore, 2P modes of social cognition may involve a lot
of observation and only a minimal amount of action (see, for
example, Schilbach et al. (2010) on interactive gaze following).
Furthermore, 2P modes of social cognition may involve cogni-
tive processes such as mental state attribution. Imagine that I am
playing an online chess-game with a friend who lives in the US.
I’m staring at my computer screen and from time to time I click
on my left mouse button. There is a lot of mindreading going
on: I am trying to find out what my friend’s next move will be,
and whether I can capture his queen in the next turn. This sce-
nario qualifies as a 2P mode of social cognition—even though it
involves a lot of mindreading and only a minimal amount of bod-
ily movement—because there is reciprocal interaction between
us. Now imagine that I am helping someone who is drunk walk
home8. I am practically dragging him forward, but he is too drunk
to realize this. I am not thinking about whether he believes he is
drunk, or whether he still desires beer; all my attention is focused
on preventing him from stumbling. On our view, this scenario
should not be classified as a 2P mode of social cognition. Despite
the fact that it features a very active agent who is not engaged in
mindreading, there is no reciprocity between the agents and hence
no 2P interaction.
These examples show that capacities that are usually associ-
ated with (non-reciprocal) 3P modes of social cognition, such
as perspective taking, actually play a crucial role in (recipro-
cal) 2P modes of social cognition as well. Developmental studies
show that this is not only true for adult human beings, but also
for infants. Buttelmann et al. (2009), for example, provides an
7Our notion of cognitive perspective-taking is rather demanding, in the sense
that it requires children to be sensitive to beliefs and desires as propositional
attitudes with propositional content. Elsewhere we have argued that stud-
ies on “implicit” false belief understanding in early infancy do not meet this
constraint (e.g., de Bruin et al., 2011; Section 4; Strijbos and de Bruin, forth-
coming, Section 6). Although we realize that this is a controversial issue, we
do not have enough space to discuss it in more detail.
8We thank one of the reviewers for bringing this interesting example to our
attention.
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excellent illustration of how infants manage to engage in recip-
rocal interaction with an experimenter by taking into account his
visual perspective. In the experiment, infants watched as a toy was
transferred from box A to box B while an experimenter either wit-
nessed the transfer of the toy (true belief condition) or not (false
belief condition). Then the experimenter attempted unsuccess-
fully to open box A—the empty box. In the true belief condition,
infants could follow their natural tendency to help the experi-
menter by opening box A for him. In the false belief condition,
if infants understood the experimenter’s false belief, they had to
understand that he wanted the toy he thought was in there. In this
case they should not simply help him to open box A, but rather
go to box B and retrieve the toy for him. The results indicated
that, by 18 months of age, infants were able to actively assist the
experimenter in his search for the toy. What this shows is that
perspective taking is not limited to non-reciprocal 3P modes of
social cognition, but instead plays a constitutive role in 2P modes
of social cognition as well.
According to our reconceptualization, 2P modes of social cog-
nition can but do not necessarily have to be cooperative in nature.
Competitive interactions can still be reciprocal. Think, for exam-
ple, of a tennis game or a soccer match. Furthermore, 2P modes
of social cognition are not only about understanding other agents
but also about misunderstanding them. As de Jaegher (2009)
suggests “misunderstandings are the pivots around which the
really interesting stuff of social understanding revolves. In these
instances where coordination is lost, we have the potential to gain
a lot of understanding” (p. 540).
THE REAL CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE
Let us briefly summarize our line of argument. So far we argued
against two ways in which the distinction between 2P versus 3P
modes of social cognition can be articulated: as active engagement
versus passive observation, and as social interaction versus social
cognition. Instead, we have proposed an alternative conceptual-
ization of this distinction—one that gives pride of place to the
notion of reciprocity. Accordingly, capacities that interaction the-
orists take to be characteristic of 3Pmodes of social cognition play
an important role in 2P modes of social cognition as well.
Thus, on our view, 2P modes of social cognition may involve
mindreading. However, this does not mean that we take min-
dreading to be a necessary ingredient of 2P modes of social
cognition. Consider the “signaling” model of social cognition
recently put forward by Frith and Frith (2011). This model dis-
tinguishes between involuntary signaling and ostensive signaling.
Involuntary signaling is automatically triggered by bodily move-
ment. Frith and Frith point out that the perception of biological
movements elicits activity in the STS, especially the posterior
part (Allison et al., 2000), and suggest that this is likely to be
a very basic and universal brain mechanism. Ostensive signal-
ing, by contrast, is done deliberately (e.g., by making eye contact
or calling someone by name). This type of signaling is needed
for “closing the loop” in 2P modes of social cognition, where
both sender and receiver need mutual knowledge that signals are
being exchanged deliberately. Furthermore, Frith and Frith pro-
pose that a critical role in establishing mutual knowledge between
sender and receiver is played by anterior rostral medial prefrontal
cortex (MPF) or arMPFC (see also Amodio and Frith, 2006). And
because activity in the arMPFC is elicited by mentalizing tasks,
they argue thatmindreading is very important for closing the loop
between minds.
We would like to propose that what is required for closing the
loop is reciprocal interaction rather than mutual knowledge. This
proposal is less problematic as well as less demanding. It is less
problematic than the requirement of mutual knowledge because,
in order for knowledge between agents to be mutual, each agent
has to know what the other agent knows and also know that the
other agent knows that the first agent knows etc. This leads to an
infinite regress (Lewis, 1969; Clark and Marshall, 1981; Sperber
andWilson, 1995). It is less demanding because it does not neces-
sarily involve mindreading (since mindreading is only necessary
as long as we assume that mutual knowledge is required to close
the gap). Our discussion of the various forms of perspective tak-
ing (see “Reconceptualizing 2P Interaction” section) showed that
there is more than one way to close the loop between minds.
For example, visual perspective taking closes the loop insofar
it enables agents to represent whether a given object is seen by
another agent—without requiring them to attribute mental states
to others (Hutto, 2011). Cognitive perspective taking, by contrast,
enables agents to represent another agent’s belief about a given
state of affairs. This way of closing the gap does involve mental
state attribution.
What are the implications of our view for neuroscientific
research on social cognition? First, our reconceptualization of
2P interaction is meant to encourage researchers to take into
account both observational and enactive conditions when study-
ing the neural correlates of reciprocal interaction. For example,
it would be interesting to contrast observational 2P conditions
in which subjects are following the gaze of a virtual avatar
(Schilbach et al., 2010) with more enactive 2P conditions in
which subjects are throwing a ball with a virtual avatar (David
et al., 2006). This would make clear to what extent these con-
ditions recruit common resources or are neurally differentiated.
Second, our proposal invites a closer look at the role of cogni-
tive processing in reciprocal interaction. So far, a lot of research
in social neuroscience has focused on non-reciprocal modes of
social cognition, in which subjects have to attribute mental states
to another agent. We know that mental state attribution in such
conditions is associated with a Theory of Mind network, con-
sisting of the MPF, the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), the STS
and the temporal poles (Frith and Frith, 2003; Amodio and
Frith, 2006). However, what we also want to know is to what
extent this network is recruited during reciprocal interactions,
in which subjects have to attribute mental states to each other.
The new field of neuro-economics, for example, uses paradigms
from game theory and behavioral economics to study the neural
correlates of social interactions and preferences, e.g., for fair-
ness, cooperation and trust (e.g., Singer, 2012). Most studies
in this field involve reciprocal interactions in which subjects
attribute mental states to each other, for instance when play-
ing some version of the prisoner’s dilemma game. It would
be interesting to see if these reciprocal interactions share com-
mon (neural) resources with the non-reciprocal modes of social
cognitionmentioned above. Similar questions can be raised about
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the role of the MNS in reciprocal interactions. Most MNS studies
still employ non-reciprocal paradigms, in which subjects either
observe another agent’s action or perform the same action them-
selves. The real challenge to social neuroscience would be to
transform both Theory of Mind and MNS studies into full-
blown dynamical studies involving reciprocal 2P interactions.
This might not be as hard as it looks. For example, one could
take a classic version of the false belief test, in which infants
have to attribute false belief to another agent, as a starting point,
and add reciprocal elements like gaze interaction between the
infant and the agent in a stepwise manner. Such an experiment
might also put the findings on false belief understanding in a new
perspective.
In this article we have argued for an understanding of 2P
modes of social cognition in terms of reciprocity. What distin-
guishes 2P from 3Pmodes of social cognition is not the amount of
action involved or the absence of cognitive processing, but rather
the fact that they involve reciprocal interaction. In the end, this
is what the interactive turn in social cognition research should be
about.
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